The impact of procurement policy, introduced in the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in 2010 has been assessed on the rice growers' income. For study, a sample of 100 farmers selling their rice produce at the procurement centres established by the government and a matching sample of 50 farmers selling their market surplus rice in the open market was selected. The difference-in-differences (DD) quasi-experimental design was used to find the impact. The results revealed that for the farmers who sold their produce at the procurement centres, the DD was of ` 175/q for the coarse rice variety and of ` 77/q for the semi-fine variety compared to the control group. The farmers who chose to sell their produce at the procurement centres had an additional income of ` 6725/farmer. The education has been found to be the only socioeconomic variable that affects the farmers' decision to sell at of the government procurement centres (p < 0.05). The government intervention had thus ended the distress sale by the farmers, broken the monopoly of the private rice traders /millgroups, created market competition and even increased the prices of the Basmati varieties not procured by the government. The study has emphasized on the need of expanding education in the area so that farmers may take informed decisions on selling their produce.
Introduction
In India, the foodgrain production, which was hovering around 200 million tonnes (Mt) up to 2005-06, reached a high of 244.8 Mt in 2010-11 and was estimated to be over 255 Mt in 2012 -13 (MoA, 2013 . Since 2007-08, the government procurement of foodgrains, particularly of wheat and rice, has increased substantially. This procurement policy is a part of the national commitment to make the Minimum Support Price (MSP) policy effective. The total foodgrains procurement has increased from 35. Corporation of India (FCI) was holding 82.4 Mt of foodgrains, the highest amount ever received. The volume of rice procurement in its total production accounted for about 14.5 per cent in the 1980s, which increased to 16.5 per cent in the 1990s, 30 per cent in 2000 and 33.7 per cent in 2011-12 (Sharma, 2012) .
(q) was achieved. In 2011, the FCI was reluctant to procure the marketable-surplus rice from the state; however, with the efforts of APD, rice was procured in 2011, although the PCs were set up rather late (after mid-November 2011) when most of the farmers had already made distress sale of their marketable-surplus. This resulted in a decreased procurement in 2011, when only 19722 q of rice were procured, a decrease of 48.8 per cent vis-à-vis procurement in 2010. In 2012, despite timely initiatives of the APD, Government of J&K, the procurement process was delayed as late as midOctober due to the indecisive behaviour of the FCI. The APD facilitated and ensured that 13 PCs were established in 2012-2013 by the FCI for rice procurement at the MSP.
The involvement of government in the agricultural sector is all-encompassing and significant. The government policies in research, extension services, infrastructure, commodity and conservation programmes, as well as organizational and structural dimensions are designed to greatly impact agriculture (Ahearn et al., 2002) . Certain government policies are designed to directly impact agriculture including those of the procurement policy to smallholders in the Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir. The present study has been conducted to discern the benefits of the government procurement policy to smallholders in the Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir. All the 13 PCs established by the APD were selected to study and evaluate the impact of the procurement policy.
Materials and Methods

Data Collection
The sample was selected using the multistage sampling technique. At the first stage, three districts, viz. Jammu, Kathua and Samba, were selected because PCs were established by the government in these three districts. At the second stage, a sample size of 100 farmers from the experimental group (with government intervention), and 50 farmers from the control group (without government intervention) were selected for the study. All the PCs located in Bishnah, Arnia, R.S.Pura, Sohanjana, Gajansoo, Channu Chak, Pargwal, Khour and Jourian (Jammu district), Ramgarh and Vijaypur (Samba district), and Nagri-ParoleChanigran and Sanji Morh (Kathua district) were selected for the study. At the third stage, proportional random sampling without replacement was performed for selecting the farmers from each of these PCs. The sample size for each PC was decided by the proportionate allocation method from the total number of farmers (691) availing the procurement facilities. A sample of 100 farmers was drawn using the random sampling method. For comparison, a sample of 50 matching farmers was selected based on the operational landholding size and history of having cultivated coarse and semi-fine rice varieties in 2012. A total of 66 villages were covered under the present study. The data were collected using the personal interview method in 2012 using a semi-structured interview schedule. The data were analyzed using the SPSS 16.0 computer programme. The "t" test and binary logistic regression model were applied in the study.
Empirical Models
The difference-in-differences (DD) non-equivalent control group design (Table 1 ) was employed to identify the difference between the experimental group (farmers who sold their marketable-surplus of rice at the PCs) and the control group (farmers who sold their produce in the open market). The DD model was employed to eliminate the in-built, systematic or seasonal effects in the rice sale rate. Besides, the impact of the procurement policy was measured by employing with and without government intervention.
The binary logistic regression analysis was carried out to find the effect of socio-personal and economic variables on the decision to sell marketable-surplus at the PCs. Both enter and forward stepwise methods were used for delineating the independent variables affecting farmers' decision to avail procurement facilities. However, the forward stepwise criterion was followed to select the best predicting variables. At each step the predictor which contributed the most to prediction was added. For the entry of the predictors into the model, a default value of 10 per cent significance level was adopted. The result of this type of regression can be expressed as per Equation (1):
where, p represents the probability of the outcome; b 0 is the y-intercept, and x 1 to x k represent the predictors in the equation.
For validation, the model chi-square value was considered, while Nagelkerke's R 2 was used to determine the variation caused by predictors. The significance of the model indicates that all the independent variables in the model together produce a significant variation in a dependent variable. The nine variables considered are given in Table 2 .
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the sample farmers, both experimental and control, are presented in Table  3 along with t-values and p-values. It was observed that the farmers who sold their produce at the PCs were younger and more educated than those in the control group and the difference was significant. There was no significant difference in the average landholding size of the experimental and control groups of farmers (t = 1.290, p = 0.199, d.f. = 148). This was the only variable considered for selecting a sample matching the control because marketing-surplus is landholdingdependent. The average area under rice crop cultivation in the case of the experimental group of farmers (2.84 ha) and the control group (2.23 ha) was same and the difference of 0.61ha was not statistically significant. Out of 150 farm households, only 29 per cent exclusively depended on farm income for their livelihood, whereas 71 per cent had both off-farm and on-farm incomes.
Marketable-Surplus Rice
In 2012, the total procurement of coarse and semifine varieties of rice at the PCs was of 19090 q and 17030 q, respectively. The marketable surplus of coarse and semi-fine rice varieties in the total production was 98.2 per cent in the experimental group and 97.6 per cent in the control group of farmers. Compared to 2011 crop season, the marketable surplus in 2012 showed a decrease for the coarse rice, and an increase in the semifine varieties in both the groups (Table 4) .
Impact of Procurement Policy
In 2012, the difference in the selling prices of rice between experimental group and control group was found significant (Table 5 ). The experimental group of farmers earned ` 157/ q more for their marketablesurplus of coarse rice, which was statistically significant (t = 14.442, p = 0.000, d.f. = 69). They also earned significantly higher returns of ` 101/q for the semi-fine variety of rice, which was (` 1278) also statistically significant (t = 14.385, p = 0.000, d.f. = 96) ( Table 5 ). The difference in the market prices of Basmati rice (` 116/q) and long grain non-Basmati rice (` 24/q) between the experimental and control groups was not significant (Table 5 ). This finding clearly reveals that the farmers in the experimental group benefitted significantly from the procurement of the coarse and semi-fine rice produce at MSP.
Difference-in-differences between Experimental and Control groups
To overcome the seasonal effect on selling price, the difference-in-differences (DD) model was The experimental and control groups of farmers had also earned better prices for their marketable surplus of Basmati and long grain non-Basmati rice (Table 7) , although the increase was not significant. In the experimental group, the prices of the common grade, semi-fine, Basmati and Sharbati varieties increased Overall, the government intervention had certainly benefited the farmers in selling their marketable surplus rice in 2012-2013. However, when we compared the results of with/without and the DD models, we observed an interesting finding. Table 5 reveals a significant difference in the rates between the experimental and control groups of farmers in both the coarse (` 157/q) and semi-fine (` 101/q) rice varieties. On the other hand, Table 6 shows that when the rates were compared by the DD model, a difference of 175/q in the coarse rice between the experimental and control groups of farmers was significant, while the difference of ` 77/q for the semi-fine rice varieties was statistically non-significant. This implies that the earlier difference of ` 335/q (with/ without) was not entirely due to the effect of the PCs.
The actual economic benefit accruing to the experimental group of farmers due to the establishment of the PCs by the government was ` 175/q. However, the presence of the PCs in the area assisted in boosting the rice prices in 2012-2013. As far as the semi-fine varieties were concerned, the results were different when compared with both types of designs (with/ without, before/after and DD model). With-without and before/after comparison showed significant economic benefit per quintal sale price between experimental and control groups but DD results were not statistically significant.
With/without a difference in the selling prices of the different rice varieties (Table 5 ) on extrapolation for the total procurement in 2012-2013 reflects higher economic returns. The procurement policy definitely generated an additional income of ` 6,837 per farmer for the coarse and semi-fine varieties. On extrapolating the benefits based on DD model, the economic impact is evident to the tune of ` 6725 per farmer. The study amply confirms that the DD is the stronger quasiexperimental model for assessing the impact of a programme. This design has been employed by Reddy and Suryamani (2005) ; Mancini et al. (2006); Preneetvatakel and Waibel (2006) and Sharma (2011) to measure the impact of agricultural development programmes.
Socio-personal and Economic Factors Impacting Farmers' Decision
The binary logistic model (enter and forward stepwise) was employed to identify the effect of sociopersonal and economic variables on the farmers' decision to sell the marketable surplus produce at the PCs. In enter method, age and squared age of the farmers significantly impacted their decision to sell the produce at PCs. The model applied has a log likelihood value of 167.268 and a chi-squared value of 23.686, which was significant at p=0.034 (Table 8) .
However, when we applied forward stepwise method, at first step only education variable affected the farmers' decision to sell the marketable surplus produce at the PCs (p < 0.05). And at second step, age and education caused variation (p < 0.10). However, other variables that included squared age and interaction of age and education were removed. Thus, education was the only variable that significantly affects the farmers' decision to sell their marketable surplus at the PCs. Thus, educated farmers benefited more from the government policy. The results are in line with the findings of Sharma (2011). 
Concluding Remarks
The government intervention has provided benefits to the rice growers in Jammu & Kashmir by procuring rice at the MSP at its procurement centres and stopping distress sales in the state. The government intervention also benefited the control group of farmers, although these farmers did not avail the facility of PCs for selling their produce. It created a competition in the market, thus fetching a better price for their produce in 2012 as compared to 2011. The smallholding farmers who ensure food security require government security to maintain the prices of their marketable surplus produce.
This study has raised some important issues related to policy, including infrastructure. One, how procurement policy can be implemented efficiently to extend to a wider reach. Two, the PCs need to be made permanent with all basic facilities like concrete flooring, timely payment, winnowing fans, etc. Three, since education has emerged as the main factor in affecting farmers decision to avail government established procurement facilities, there is need of expanding educational facilities in the area and fourth, to quantify the impact of a programme, the DD model is better and more robust, the with/without comparison method does not eliminate either in-built, systematic or seasonal effects.
